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“Wantonly and so freakishly imposed … the same way that being struck by lightning is 
cruel and unusual.” This excerpt, espoused by Justice Potter Stewart, is included in the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s 1972 Furman v. Georgia decision to strike down capital punishment in the 
United States. When the practice was later reinstated, in 1976, it was under the pretense that its 
arbitrary and discriminatory nature had been assuaged. Since that time, the practice has 
increasingly become the subject of national debate. While states continue to either outlaw death 
sentences or impose a moratorium, differences in application are most salient at the county level. 
Various studies have attempted to explain these vast discrepancies, but few scholars have 
reached a consensus on what characteristic or other factor is the best predictor of how frequently 
a county will employ the practice. 
Perhaps the most influential actor in the criminal justice system is a prosecutor. Scholars 
have written on the discretion wielded by these figures and their immense advantage over public 
defenders and the accused. Of course, a prosecutor is just a piece of the equation. Jurors, judges, 
witnesses, and defendants themselves all play a role in a sentencing outcome following a 
conviction. Because prosecutors are generally elected officials, the jurisdiction’s electorate can 
have a significant impact on death sentencing rates as well. Still, very little research exists 
surrounding the impact of prosecutors specifically on death sentencing rates. I hope to begin to 
fill that gap with this project.  
Making use of a combined database that features the top 30 death sentencing counties1 in 
the country, this paper seeks to differentiate between the impact of county characteristics and 
that of the top prosecutors. Analysis, in fact, shows evidence for the effects of many variables. I 
 
1 The top 30 death sentencing counties include those that have imposed the most cumulative death sentences 
since 1976. 
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find that while most prosecutors do conform to county traditions and precedents set for them, 
there exist several outliers that substantially deviate from those patterns. The extent of power 
prosecutors wield that enables them to make these imprints on sentencing averages, or not, is 
what constitutes an important and novel finding here.     
The findings included in this paper raise various questions regarding the use of capital 
punishment in the United States. Under the 14th Amendment, equal protection under the law is 
guaranteed to all persons. Has the modern death penalty satisfied the revisions required by 
Furman and, further, does it satisfy the equal protection clause?  
Relevant Research and Precedent 
Background on Capital Punishment 
America’s modern death penalty began in 1976 with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Gregg 
v. Georgia. This decision struck down its previous ruling in Furman v. Georgia (1972), in which 
the court determined that the arbitrary nature in which the death penalty was being applied was 
unconstitutional. Since then, the practice has been increasingly narrowed on a national scale and 
dismissed entirely in multiple states. In the case of Atkins v. Virginia (2002), the court deemed 
capital punishment for mentally disabled persons to be unconstitutional. In 2005, it increased 
restriction by outlawing the death penalty for those under 18 years of age. With this narrowing, 
however, has also come increased geographical concentration.  
As explained in Deadly Justice (2017), the Gregg decision included an often-overlooked 
requirement by the Supreme Court. Georgia was required to review its sentences in order to 
validate each as “proportionate.” The state appellate courts were then tasked with enforcing 
proportionality review by commuting a sentence if it was found to be inconsistent with others in 
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the state. According to Baumgartner et al., proportionality review has been largely abandoned by 
judges and lawyers alike.  
The Modern Death Penalty 
Since the death penalty’s reinstatement in 1976, it has been applied arbitrarily, not only 
across states but within them. There is also strong evidence that death sentences are 
disproportionately handed down to minority groups, specifically African American men and 
impoverished persons. It should be noted that the court cited racial bias as a basis for initially 
striking down the death penalty in Furman. The ACLU reports that 55% of the death row 
population is people of color and in 80% of capital cases, the victim is white. For reference, 
31.7% of the U.S. population was identified as African American or Hispanic in the 2019 U.S. 
census estimates. White victims make up roughly half of all murder victims. This disparate racial 
distribution appears to be a theme across crime statistics. Lofstrom and Raphael (2016) presented 
findings of significant decline in crime within the United States in recent decades, but found 
heightened populations of inmates. Adjacent to this increase, they found a higher likelihood of 
incarceration for low-income households, less-educated men, and African Americans. While it is 
not a new finding that African American men have higher incarceration rates than whites in the 
U.S., it is further evidence of inconsistent application across the country and across crimes. 
Despite these disturbing findings, U.S. counties on average have experienced a drastic 
decline in death sentences in recent decades, much of which may be attributed to evolving 
norms. A report by the Death Penalty Information Center (2013) concluded that just 2% of U.S. 
counties account for the majority of the death row population. The organization also reported 
that 31 states had outlawed capital punishment or gone 10 years without an execution. Six 
additional states had not carried out an execution in five years. Gal and Mark (2018) reported on 
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2018 data from the Center, using the following maps2, which show continued disparate national 
application.  
 
When this illustration is reduced to the county level, the separation is even more striking. The 
first map in the following series, provided by Ford (2015), shows counties with five or more 
death sentences between 2004 and 2009. The second shows those handing down more than 10 
death sentences in the same years. Since death sentencing has continued to decline in the last 
decade, these maps would likely look even more sparse if created today.  
 
Kovarsky (2016) analyzed capital outcomes, or the number of death sentences and 
executions combined, through a series of three metrics that he developed. Using four- and five-
year periods between 1996 and 2015, he demonstrated that the concentration of death sentences 
is increasing quickly on the national level and, further, that this pattern holds within those states 
 
2 At the time of the study, New Hampshire still had the practice on its books. The state abolished the death penalty in 
2019. 
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exercising capital punishment. This finding makes a convincing argument for county-level 
importance as opposed to state-level. Further, Kovarsky found three county distribution 
characteristics to be unreflective of the geographic distribution of death sentences seen in the 
data: concentration of county population, distribution of homicides, and locally differentiated 
punishment norms.  
The decline of the juvenile death penalty reveals trends in years leading up to the 2004 
Roper v. Simmons decision, in which the Supreme Court deemed the execution of individuals 
under the age of 18 to be a constitutional violation under the Eighth Amendment. Just prior to 
this decision, Fagan and West (2005) studied the near absence of the juvenile death penalty. 
They found that the steepest decline occurred in 1999 in all states, six years prior to Roper. After 
controlling for alternative explanations, such as a decline in juvenile crime rates, Fagan and West 
argued that the drop was largely a result of developing norms or “evolving standards of 
decency.” The three states that applied the punishment most frequently, Texas, Florida, and 
Alabama, accounted for over 50% of juvenile death sentences. Interestingly, the study found 
rates of juvenile death sentences to be correlated with rates of total death sentences. This seems 
to echo the findings of Baumgartner et al., which suggested that historical consistency within a 
jurisdiction plays a key role in future outcomes. Still, Fagan and West’s findings seem to mirror 
current death sentencing trends and, therefore, suggest that changes in adult death sentencing are 
imminent. 
Theories of Disparate Application 
A study by Baumgartner, Box-Steffensmeier, and Campbell (2018) analyzed data from 
1,422 executions across 474 counties from 1977 to 2014. Using bootstrapped kolmogorov-
smirnov tests and conditional frailty models, they examined the phenomenon of event 
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dependency in local jurisdictions’ execution rates. First, they showed that when controlling for 
population size, the number of homicides within a county is not correlated with the number of 
executions within that same county. Their major finding demonstrates that the future likelihood 
of an execution occurring within a county can be predicted by the number of executions that 
have occurred there in the past. More specifically, they showed that executions follow a power 
law, in which future likelihood increases proportionally to past frequency.  
The authors set out to determine whether the event dependency phenomenon holds true 
after introducing confounding variables. They first considered certain characteristics of a county: 
population size, poverty rate, homicides, and “minority threat.” Then, they introduced the 
number of previous executions carried out in that county to the equation. They found population 
to have an impact on death sentencing, while poverty and homicides did not. Most importantly, 
the findings demonstrated the significant impact of event dependence on execution rates in a 
given county. If county execution data appeared random, a case may be made for natural 
fluctuation. This data, however, presents itself as a “stretched distribution,” which confirms that 
event dependence plays a role in frequency of county executions. Further, the authors noted that 
event dependence may have some effect on how legal actors behave. For instance, the 
knowledge of previous executions in a county may render prosecutors more confident of 
securing a death sentence, thereby encouraging them to seek it. It is important to note that 
Baumgartner et al. were exploring the effects of event dependence on executions, not death 
sentences, which I will be examining. Because both executions and death sentences share the 
increasingly salient feature of concentration, however, it is reasonable to expect them to behave 
similarly.  
 9 
In Brandon Garrett’s 2017 book, “End of Its Rope: How Killing the Death Penalty can 
Revive Criminal Justice,” he examined the decline of the death penalty beginning in the late 
1990s. Finding a correlation between murder rates and death sentencing, he concluded that the 
decline in murders may have impacted the decline in death sentencing within counties. He found 
that capital punishment is now largely absent in rural counties, possibly attributable to cost. 
Those that still do use the practice, he explained, tend to have relatively large black populations.  
Similar to the findings of Baumgartner et al. with regard to executions, Garrett found 
support for the event dependency, or what he deemed “inertia,” within a county. That is, it is 
possible to predict which counties will likely seek death in the future based on prior numbers and 
averages. Kovarsky may agree, as he has also written on this impact. As he found in his 2016 
article, an overall decline in death sentences in the United States has been accompanied by 
increased concentration of those death sentences that are handed down. He attributed this 
phenomenon primarily to what he refers to as “local muscle memory,” in which a jurisdiction 
develops a personality that subsequently acts as a guide in future convictions. 
Prosecutorial Role 
Another explanation of increasing county concentration is what I refer to as 
“prosecutorial preference.” This theory suggests that the major decision maker in a county 
criminal justice system, the chief prosecutor, wields enough unbalanced discretion to impose 
personal decisions on sentencing outcomes, leading sentencing trends and deviations to be 
largely determined by one actor.  
Of course, prosecutorial immunity is a steadfast rule in the United States. As a result of 
the 1976 decision in Imbler v. Pachtman, in which the court deemed prosecutors immune from 
any civil suit surrounding their actions while in office, prosecutors were effectively rendered 
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untouchable in cases of negligence or misconduct. In her 2019 book, “Charged,” Emily Bazelon 
pointed to the introduction of mandatory minimum sentences in the 1980s, when fear of crime 
reached an all-time high, and politicians capitalized on that fear, ultimately following through 
with policy. These mandatory sentences, Bazelon explained, led to removing any power of a 
judge. The prosecutor, however, is still the determinant of the type of charge an accused person 
will receive.  
While not many scholars have pointed to the theory of prosecutorial preference 
specifically, there are reports on prosecutorial conduct and discretion, and the influence of these 
aspects on sentencing outcomes. A report by the Fair Punishment Project (2016) highlighted the 
careers of those individuals who the authors believed to be the top five deadliest prosecutors. In 
addition to the jarring number of death sentences obtained throughout their terms, the report 
included quotes indicating their stances on crime and punishment. Robert H. Macy, who secured 
54 death sentences during his term in Oklahoma County, Oklahoma, stated that sentencing 
defendants to death was a “patriotic duty,” and Lynne Abraham of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 
said she was “passionate” about enforcing the death penalty. Donald V. Myers of Lexington, 
South Carolina kept a paperweight in the shape of an electric chair on his desk, while Johnny 
Holmes from Harris County, Texas, who oversaw 208 death sentence convictions, told the public 
that “if you kill someone here, the state of Texas is going to kill you.” In each of the cases 
presented in the report, the number of death sentences is noticeably high, suggesting some truth 
to the theory of prosecutorial preference. These anecdotes certainly give an initial indication of 
evidence for the imposition of personal beliefs on sentencing trends during a prosecutor’s term.  
Garrett (2017) touched on the role of prosecutors as well, offering some anecdotal 
evidence of what he calls overzealous prosecution. He described how Johnny Holmes became 
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known as the “Texas Terminator” for his capital stance. He noted that just after Holmes left 
office in 2000, death sentences exhibited a slow decline in Harris County. Garrett attributed this 
to the possibility of a fading muscle memory. This finding may suggest that while a county can 
develop sentencing habits, the effect of the prosecutor on those habits may lead to noticeable 
change once that official is removed from the equation.  
In his article, Kovarsky added that local actors, such as law enforcement and legal staff, 
possess significant discretion in determining the course and outcome of a case, which contributes 
to consistency across convictions within a jurisdiction. He further discussed the role of 
prosecutors, deeming them “perhaps the greatest source of local variation.” He explained that 
prosecutors are often involved in every step of the capital process, from the decision to seek 
death to securing the death warrant. He added, however, that the prosecution, along with defense 
counsel, judges, and others, are only one part of the process, with numerous other actors 
involved to balance out the power. For instance, the jury theoretically represents a panel of peers 
of the accused. Kovarsky refuted the idea that jurors could affect such discrepancies, however, 
arguing that the level of county variation in capital outcomes is too large to result from juror 
differences from one county to the next within a state. Further, jurors typically must meet a 
standard of “death qualified” to even be considered as a juror in a capital trial. This practically 
guarantees a death sentence should convincing arguments be presented for its use.  
While Kovarsky’s study did not touch on prosecutorial misconduct, there are important 
findings that identify a correlation between death sentencing and malpractice. The Fair 
Punishment Project (2016) presented evidence showing that prosecutors with record high rates of 
death sentences during their term also maintained higher rates of misconduct. It provided the 
example of Joe Freeman Britt’s term as District Attorney in Robeson County, North Carolina. 
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While he was District Attorney, criminals were 100 times more likely to receive a death sentence 
than any other randomly selected person in the United States. The report states that misconduct 
was found in a third of capital cases overseen by Britt. Ryan Patrick Alfond, a District Attorney 
in Oklahoma County, worked with a forensic scientist to falsify evidence in death sentences he 
sought and make misleading claims in court. Nearly all of the death sentences he oversaw were 
reversed. Moreover, rates within counties where the deadliest prosecutors have served show a 
rapid decline in rates of death sentences following their term. Consistent with the Fair 
Punishment Project’s report, the 2% Report by the Death Penalty Information Center (2013) also 
found counties exhibiting the heaviest use of death sentencing to have high rates of reversal on 
appeal. Florida, home to the second largest death row population in the country, has freed more 
people than any other state. While the rates of misconduct in high sentencing counties may not 
seem overtly relevant to the prosecutorial preference theory, they certainly indicate an unchecked 
power wielded by prosecutors that may have a major impact on sentencing outcomes. This may, 
therefore, be further evidence for the theory.  
Another study conducted by the Fair Punishment Project, in 2017, also highlighted 
certain prosecutors who have served or currently serve in a top 30 death sentencing county. For 
instance, Amy Weirich is the current District Attorney in Shelby, Tennessee, which is ranked 
19th on the list of top death sentencing counties. The study ranked Shelby first in misconduct 
and reversal out of the 95 counties in the state. Among many examples, it reported on the 
instance in which Weirich was reprimanded by the state Supreme Court for withholding 
evidence from one defendant’s attorneys—a violation of the Brady Doctrine3—and making 
“inflammatory comments” about their decision to not provide testimony.  
 
3 The Brady Doctrine arose from Brady v. Maryland (1963) and requires prosecutors to provide the defense with 
any and all exculpatory evidence. 
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 The report also ranked Orleans Parish, Louisiana, first in the state for misconduct, citing 
the high number of Brady violations that have occurred in the jurisdiction. Specifically, the 
Project found that current District Attorney Leon Cannizarro had committed 20 instances of 
misconduct. Under his leadership, the District Attorney’s Office has been admonished by judges 
for delaying the delivery of relevant evidence to the defense. 
The Project ranked Orange County third for misconduct out of all California counties and 
second for reversals. Specifically, it highlighted the practices of Tony Rackauckas, reporting that 
between 1997 and 2009, there were 58 allegations of misconduct against his office. In one 
instance among many, a judge forbade the Orange County District Attorney’s Office from 
playing a role in a murder trial due to its withholding of information and, subsequently, lying 
about it. 
Prosecutors are typically allocated significantly more and higher quality resources to aid 
in their prosecution compared to that of the often court-appointed attorneys of defendants. This 
allows them to control cases with relative ease. Considering this and the low likelihood of 
retribution, prosecutors appear to be limited in action only by their own beliefs on fair and equal 
punishment. 
The Current Puzzle 
This paper explores a puzzle that surrounds two competing theories. The first argues that 
the extreme county concentration of death sentences is due to characteristics about that county, 
such as racial threat, homicide levels, population, and cumulative previous death sentences. The 
second theory, and the one that this paper puts forth, argues that, over and above all other 
county-level factors, the individual choices of the county prosecutor drive differences in death 
sentencing rates.  
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County Characteristics and Demographics 
 
There are reasons to assume that county characteristics would be the main drivers of 
death sentencing. For instance, the highest numbers of death sentences come from high 
population counties: Philadelphia, Los Angeles, and Houston. Of course, it is expected that 
metropolitan areas with large concentrations of people would exhibit higher crime rates and, 
thus, impose more sentences. At the same time, there are other large metropolitan areas that do 
not follow the same trend and, in fact, appear to sentence less than those counties with smaller 
populations. It is, therefore, necessary to explore the validity of this assumption. Similar logic 
may follow with regard to the number of homicides in a county. With more death-eligible crimes 
should come more opportunities for death sentencing. Further, an argument could be made that 
with a high crime rate may come public pressure for harsher and more aggressive sentencing 
tactics.  
There is substantial evidence suggesting that characteristics of a defendant can be strong 
predictors of whether a sentence will be handed down. With this knowledge, it logically follows 
that a county in which the demographics reflect those most vulnerable to the system will have a 
higher number of sentences compared with those that do not. Men of color typically have a 
higher likelihood of receiving a longer or harsher sentence, compared with their white and 
female counterparts. It follows, then, that counties with higher percentages of minorities would 
impose more death sentences than counties with smaller minority populations. On the other 
hand, the racial threat hypothesis may cause deviation from this pattern. The racial threat 
hypothesis argues that up to a certain threshold of population percentage, white citizens of a 
community will perceive a growing threat by the non-white population. After this threshold is 
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reached, the racial threat becomes null, evidently because rising exposure can lead to increased 
tolerance by a majority group.  
Economic status of the defendant could also logically be relevant to the number of death 
sentences. Money pervades every part of the criminal justice system and can have a major impact 
on the experience of a defendant. This can begin from the moment a defendant is taken into 
custody, based on the ability to post bail or not. Once charges are pressed, the quality of 
representation received by a defendant can be entirely reliant on the amount the defendant is able 
to pay. With poor legal representation comes a less lenient sentence, leading counties with higher 
impoverished populations to encounter higher death sentencing rates. This is all to say that 
counties with high poverty levels may sentence at higher rates than their wealthier counterparts.  
A final and major county characteristic is past sentencing trends or, specifically for the 
purposes of this paper, cumulative previous death sentences in a county. Various authors have 
presented and studied the idea of muscle memory, or inertia, in county sentencing patterns. That 
is the idea that over time, each county develops its own legal precedent, which is subsequently 
used to guide future decisions. What makes this theory unique are the various moving parts that 
conform to work in concert with the legal culture. The developed local legal culture can act as a 
guide to the prosecutors, jurors, judges, police officers, and any other actors involved in the 
conviction and sentencing processes. For instance, prosecutors may be more inclined to seek 
death if they are confident that they can secure it. This confidence derives from past sentencing 
within that same jurisdiction. In the same way, judges may be more likely to hand down a death 
sentence if they have done so in the past. Prosecutors and other elected officials would need to 
reflect the culture in order for its development to continue. In this way, the constituents of the 
jurisdiction and, therefore the jurors, would also be somewhat reflective. There are two 
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implications to this theory. The first suggests that certain counties will sentence consistently at 
higher or lower rates compared with what would be expected, simply because they have 
developed an identity that places a strict emphasis on law and order. The second implication 
supposes that a county’s death sentencing trends over time will reflect event dependence—that is 
to say, with each death sentence handed down in the county, the likelihood of future use 
increases. As the legal culture continues to develop and solidify over time, counties across the 
country diverge and become increasingly distinct in their sentencing trends.  
Prosecutorial Preference 
 
The main contribution of this paper addresses the individual impact of the top prosecutor 
in a county at any given time. While the level of prosecutorial involvement varies by jurisdiction, 
prosecutors typically take a central role in the sentencing process of a defendant. In some 
instances, they are involved from the moment of the decision to indict up until seeking the death 
warrant (Kovarsky). Based on this, it follows that the decisions and personal beliefs of a 
prosecutor are likely a major factor, if not the driving force, behind a jurisdiction’s sentencing 
trends. There is also little evidence of any check being placed on the prosecutor’s decision. That 
is to say, there is little oversight of the actions of this individual. The validity of the prosecutorial 
preference theory does not erase the possibility of impact by other county-level characteristics. It 
does, however, rely on the idea that prosecutors can control whether county sentencing trends are 
maintained throughout their term. That is, the theory suggests that over and above all other 
relevant variable effects, individual prosecutors have a statistically significant impact on death 
sentencing in their county.  
 17 
Hypotheses 
This paper puts forth two competing hypotheses that follow logically from current 
knowledge of capital punishment. The first hypothesis is derived from the extreme concentration 
of death sentences in the United States and previous research that has shown the impact of 
county characteristics and tradition. The second hypothesis—which constitutes the primary 
contribution of this paper—relies on the idea that the role of the top county prosecutor is 
accompanied by an immense power that would naturally allow for significant influence on 
sentencing trends.  
H1: Death sentencing rates will vary exclusively by county, with no independent effect of the 
prosecutor.  
H2: Controlling for county characteristics, individual prosecutors will have an additional impact 
on the county death sentencing rate during their term.  
Data and Research Approach 
This project makes use of two datasets that have been combined to complete analysis. 
The first includes every death sentence handed down in the United States since 1976. Those 
variables for which annual information was unavailable have been computed from estimates. The 
Population and Poverty variables were taken from the census for 1972-2007, and intercensal 
years were estimated with linear interpolation. The values for 2008 and later are estimates 
derived by the American Community Survey. The Homicide variable is taken primarily from 
CDC and FBI data. For those years in which data is unavailable, predicted values are used as 
stand-ins. The Racial Threat variable used is computed with the following formula: 100 − 
|70−whitepop|.  
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The second dataset includes a list of the top prosecutors4 serving in the 30 counties with 
the highest numbers of death sentences since 1976. The prosecutor variable was collected from 
various sources. While some jurisdictions maintain a list of their public office history, many 
names had to be collected through news archives and election results. It is also important to note 
that some prosecutors do not serve out their entire term in cases of death, appointment to other 
office, or resignation. For this reason, some years saw more than one prosecutor in office. In 
those instances, the prosecutor serving the most months out of the year was recorded.  
There are three components to the analysis for this study, each of which seeks to bolster 
the evidence provided by the others. First, I present an overview of the top 30 U.S. counties that 
have had the most death sentences in the modern era and attempt to determine the impact of 
population and total homicides. The second component presents the relationship and offers a 
visual representation of the extent to which prosecutors in each of the top 30 counties sentence at 
similar rates to the other prosecutors who have served in their county. In the third and most 
comprehensive part of the results, I present four separate models, each of which adds onto the 
previous. Each model estimates logistic regressions to determine which county characteristics are 
most salient in determining future death sentencing in a county and how those resulting 
coefficients are impacted with the addition of a prosecutor variable.  
Analysis 
Population and Total Homicides in the Top 30 
 The following chapter offers the first component of analysis. I present the counties that 
are home to the most death sentences since 1976 and examine whether a relationship exists 
between the county’s population and number of homicides.  
 
4 The top prosecutor is defined as the official (typically elected) overseeing all criminal prosecution in a jurisdiction.  
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Table 1. Counties with Most Cumulative Death Sentences Since 1976 
County State Population Homicides Death Sentences DS Rate 
Los Angeles CA 9818605 54248 302 0.56 
Harris TX 4092459 20090 291 1.45 
Philadelphia PA 1526006 14967 187 1.25 
Maricopa AZ 3817117 10296 169 1.64 
Cook IL 5194675 35117 157 0.45 
Miami-Dade FL 2496435 12952 111 0.86 
Clark NV 1951269 5139 114 2.22 
Oklahoma OK 718633 3171 114 3.59 
Duval FL 864263 4628 103 2.23 
Riverside CA 2189641 4053 102 2.52 
Dallas TX 2368139 13472 98 0.73 
Cuyahoga OH 1280122 6283 81 1.29 
Orange CA 3010232 3998 81 2.03 
Hamilton OH 802374 2756 70 2.54 
Broward FL 1748066 4159 77 1.85 
Jefferson AL 658466 5480 78 1.42 
Bexar TX 1714773 6510 75 1.15 
Hillsborough FL 1229226 3527 70 1.98 
Shelby TN 927644 6834 70 1.02 
Tarrant TX 1809034 5239 72 1.37 
Pima AZ 980263 2939 64 2.18 
San Bernardino CA 2035210 6241 57 0.91 
Pinellas FL 916542 2003 63 3.14 
Alameda CA 1510271 5541 62 1.12 
Orleans LA 343829 10523 38 0.36 
Orange FL 1145956 2696 49 1.82 
Sacramento CA 1418788 3578 48 1.34 
San Diego CA 3095313 6142 47 0.77 
Mobile AL 412992 2831 46 1.62 
Polk FL 602095 1335 41 3.07 
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Table 1 features the top 30 death sentencing counties in the modern death penalty era as 
of 2018; that is, those counties with the most cumulative death sentences since 1976. For 
comparison, it includes the county populations as of 2010, total homicides, cumulative death 
sentences as of 2018, and the death sentencing rate per 100 homicides. A look at this table can 
dispel some initial assumptions surrounding the practice. It is logical to think, for instance, that 
death sentencing would be highly correlated with population because with higher numbers of 
people would likely come higher rates of crime and, thus, more opportunities for sentencing. One 
might make a similar assumption about homicides. Table 1, however, provides some initial 
evidence for refutation of this instinctual hypothesis. If population and homicides were able to 
predict the number of death sentences in a county, all three variables would be in descending 
order. Instead, we see evidence for the idea that the effect of the county itself is substantially 
stronger than any fact or statistic about that county. With regard to the top three counties, 
population and homicides are in fact in descending order; however, that pattern quickly 
disappears as we move down the list. Cook County, Illinois, has a population of five million 
compared with Maricopa County, Arizona, which is home to three million. Cook has had more 
than three times the number of homicides and, yet, Maricopa has had 12 death sentences more 
than Cook. We see the highest death sentencing rate in Oklahoma County, where the population 
doesn’t quite reach 720,000 people and where there have been just over 3,000 total homicides. 
That county has handed down 114 death sentences. That number is close to twice the number 
handed down in Alameda County, California, home to Oakland, where the population is more 






Map 1. Top 30 Death Sentencing Counties 
 
Map 1 gives a visual depiction of where the top 30 death sentencing counties are located. 
Evidently, the map is quite sparse, but California, Florida, and Texas house a large portion of 
these counties. As mentioned, equal protection under the law primarily applies within states, not 
across them. So, while interstate comparisons help illustrate national disparity, intrastate 
comparisons are the best determinant of whether the requirements of Gregg are being honored. 
California and Florida together make up 14—or just about half—of the top 30 death sentencing 
counties, with seven spots on the list each. California’s death sentencing rate in those counties—
Los Angeles, San Diego, San Bernardino, Alameda, Sacramento, Orange, and Riverside—are 
.56, .77, .91, 1.12, 1.34, 2.03, and 2.52, respectively. That means someone who commits a death-
eligible crime in Riverside is more than twice as likely to receive a death sentence as someone 
committing a crime in Los Angeles.  
We can conduct a similar analysis in Florida, home to Polk and Pinellas, which are the 
second and third highest death sentencing rates on our list. In Miami, Orange, Broward, 
Hillsborough, Duval, Polk, and Pinellas, death sentencing occurred at rates of .86, 1.82, 1.85, 
1.98, 2.23, 3.07, and 3.14 respectively. These differences are even more drastic than those within 
California. In Pinellas, Florida, a county with only 2,003 homicides since 1976, a person is more 
than three times as likely to receive a death sentence as someone who committed the same crime 
in Miami, where 12,952 homicides have occurred in that same time period.  
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Overall, we see death sentencing rates in Table 1 go from .36 in Orleans Parish to 3.59 in 
Oklahoma County, with two states making up about half of the list. Evidently, the practice is not 
being applied in a remotely equal manner.  
Table 2. Correlation Matrix (Death Sentences, Population, Homicides) 
 
 
Figure 1. Death Sentences by Cumulative County Homicides 
 
Figure 2. Death Sentences by County Population 
 
 
Overall, Table 1 offers little evidence of any significant correlation between death 
sentencing, and population and homicide numbers in a county. I confirm this minimal correlation 
in Table 2 by running a simple analysis with the annual data for those counties on the top 30 list. 
While the correlation between Death Sentences and Homicides reaches just over 50%, 
 23 
population can only account for about 40% of Death Sentences. The scatterplots shown in Figure 
1 and Figure 2 offer a visual representation of these correlations and outliers. 
This chapter of analysis has offered an overview of the relationship among death 
sentencing, county population, and homicides. I have established that the top 30 list contains 
counties with characteristics that vary widely and, thus, found there to be only a mild correlation 
among these variables. In other words, this section has shown there to be a significant number of 
sentences that cannot be predicted using population and homicide variables, thereby requiring 
further analysis.  
Prosecutorial Impact 
By presenting a number of analyses designed to test prosecutorial impact, the following 
section of results attempts to account for the discrepancy established in the previous chapter. I 
will present the levels of similarity among death sentencing rates overseen by prosecutors who 
have served in the same county.  
Figure 3. Prosecutors Compared with Others in their Same County. 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the relationship between the rate of death sentencing under one 
prosecutor and that of other prosecutors in the same county. In an initial analysis, we see a 
correlation of .47 between prosecutors and their peers. With this mid-level correlation value and 
illustration, we can conclude that there are a substantial number of prosecutors who are deviating 
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from the patterns of their predecessors and successors. This is evidence for my theory regarding 
individual prosecutorial impact. If each prosecutor had very little impact and county tradition 
was the most intense predictor, we would see the majority of points congregating around the 
correlation line. Of course, this result also shows that there are a number of prosecutors who do 
in fact align with their predecessors and successors. Still, the fact that it is clearly possible for a 
prosecutor to impose deviation in sentencing rates is what this study deems important. That is, 
regardless of whether they do in fact impact the overall county average, the power of a 
prosecutor to choose to do so or not is the relevant finding.  
It should be noted that the analysis presented in Figure 3 does not consider year effects. 
We know that certain eras in American history have been accompanied by higher and harsher 
sentences.  
Figure 4. National Death Sentencing Trends in the Modern Period 
 
Figure 4 exhibits the highest sentencing times in U.S. history, occurring primarily in the 
mid-1980s and mid-1990s. As discussed by Emily Bazelon (2019), the 1980s were accompanied 
by a rise in mandatory minimum sentences, leading to generally harsher practices. A later high-
sentencing time period took place in the mid- to late 1990s and was largely driven by the 1994 
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Crime Bill5, which left a legacy of mass incarceration still evident today. The impact stretched 
far beyond the bill itself and into the minds of Americans, who would subsequently vote for 
leaders who competed for title of “tough on crime.” That is to say, year effects can be quite 
significant in evaluating sentencing patterns and will be relevant in the following county 
illustrations.  












5 The 1994 Crime Bill refers to the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act. 
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Figure 5 Cont. 
 
Figure 5 illustrates the most salient impacts of prosecutors in the top 30 sample. In 
Pinellas County, Florida, James Russell exhibits more than double the death sentencing rate of 
his successor, Bernie McCabe. Importantly, McCabe was sworn in as national rates began to rise 
and, yet, he maintained a consistently low rate during his time in office.  
We see quite a similar—but even more dramatic—shift in Pima, Arizona, where Barbara 
LaWall cut the county rate to one-fourth that of her predecessor, Stephen Neely. The timing of 
the 1990s spikes in Neely’s term does align somewhat with national trends, while LaWall took 
office near the beginning of a national downturn in rates. Nonetheless, the drastic change in rate 
between prosecutors clearly shows an impact.  
The pattern of death sentencing in Hamilton County, Ohio, exhibits significant deviation 
among prosecutors. Arthur Ney used the practice at a rate of 5.15 per 100 homicides, more than 
2.5 times that of his successor, Joseph Deters, who also served during a peak in national death 
sentencing. This case enables us to take a unique look at the impact of national trends on county 
prosecutorial behavior. While Deters reached 10 death sentences per 100 homicides at one point 
during his first term, he barely reached a rate of 2.5 per 100 during his second term. Still, even in 
his second term, Deters deviated from his predecessor, Michael Allen, by raising the death 
sentencing rate in the midst of a national decline.  
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A similar downward trend occurred in Hillsborough, Florida, when Harry Coe 
substantially deviated from the trend of his predecessor, Bill James. Just after the national trend 
had begun to descend, Mark Ober took office in Hillsborough and the county’s sentencing rate 
dropped below 1 sentence per 100 homicides. We see a similar 1985 spike followed by a 
downturn in the 1990s in Orange, Florida, where Robert Eagan sentenced at a rate of over 10 per 
100 homicides. His successor, Lawson Lamar, cut that rate in half despite holding office at the 
height of national sentencing. Surprisingly, his sentencing rate also remained consistent 
throughout the 2000s until the final years of his term, during which there were no death 
sentences. An instance of the county trend aligning with a national rate is also illustrated in 
Clark, Nevada. The highest sentencing occurred in the late 1980s, when prosecutor Rex Bell 
sentenced at a record high rate before his successors oversaw a steady decline. Still, in the mid-
1990s, Stewart Bell oversaw a spike in sentencing, similar to national trends. 
Some of the most revealing evidence for the impact of an individual prosecutor comes 
out of Orange, California, which has followed practically the opposite pattern of the national 
death sentencing trend in the modern era of the practice. Michael Capizzi secured death 
sentences at a rate of less than 2 per 100 homicides, with his lowest rates occurring in the early 
1990s. His successor, Tony Rackauckas, oversaw the county’s highest death sentencing rate of 
the modern era in 2010 as the national rate hit its lowest point since the practice was reinstated. It 
is relevant to note that Rackauckas was identified by the Fair Punishment Project (2017) as an 
overzealous prosecutor who oversaw high rates of misconduct during his term. This offers 
evidence for the ability of prosecutors to make sentencing trends conform to their beliefs. The 
pattern in Orange occurred to a lesser degree in neighboring California county Riverside, where 
the highest rates—by more than double—were overseen by the three prosecutors elected since 
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2008. Prior to that, Grover Trask maintained a rate of 2.14, despite serving during both heights of 
national sentencing.  
Oklahoma County is home to Bob Macy, who is considered one of the deadliest 
prosecutors in history. While Macy certainly accounted for a large portion of Oklahoma’s death 
row, this seems to result largely from the length of his term. His successor, Wes Lane, who 
served for only a fraction of the length of Macy’s term and as national death sentencing rates 
were at an all-time low, managed to garner a higher death sentencing rate. Lane served under 
Macy before taking over after his retirement. While Macy’s legacy may have influenced that of 
Lane, David Prater immediately oversaw a steep decline in the county’s rate after being sworn 
in, demonstrating significant impact.  
A similar picture is painted in Harris6, Texas—a county that was also home to an 
infamous prosecutor, Johnny Holmes. Similar to Macy, a large amount of Texas death sentences 
can be traced back to Holmes’ office. His death sentencing rate over his 20-plus-year term, 
however, is far from the most aggressive we’ve seen, especially considering the eras in which he 
held office. Holmes’ legacy carried over to Chuck Rosenthal, who maintained a similar rate 
throughout his term in the 2000s. A substantial drop subsequently followed their departures 
when Pat Lykos laid a new legacy for the jurisdiction. 
Mobile, Alabama, presents quite an interesting case as well. When he took office in 1979, 
Chris Galanos made a substantial impact on the county sentencing rate by cutting it to more than 
half that of his predecessor, Charles Graddick. Galanos’ successor, John Tyson Jr., followed his 
lead, sentencing at a rate of barely more than one per 100 homicides. The most recent prosecutor, 
Ashley Rich, has overseen aggressive sentencing and brought the rate back up close to that of 
 
6 Kenneth Magidson, who only served for 11 months in 2008, was excluded from Harris County illustration. 
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Graddick, who left office in 1978. While Tyson’s term may be evidence of county tradition, Rich 
has certainly challenged that and offered support for the theory of prosecutorial preference.  




The next grouping of counties from the top 30 are featured in Figure 6 and includes those 
counties showing a less dramatic prosecutorial influence compared with those in Figure 5, while 
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still displaying some. The counties shown, however, do exhibit a slight tendency to follow 
national death sentencing trends. In Alameda, California, Thomas Orloff clearly made an impact 
by overseeing the county’s highest rate in 2000 when death sentencing on the national level was 
declining. Shortly after, however, his sentencing rate decreased to almost half that peak. Nancy 
O’Malley then cut the county’s rate to less than 1 per 100 homicides as the national trend 
continued to decline.  
While Orleans Parish has maintained a relatively low death sentencing rate, it has still 
seen a proportionately large decline since the 1990s sentencing period. Harry Connick Sr. 
interestingly hit his highest sentencing rate in the mid-1980s before cutting that rate by more 
than half during the next national height. By the end of his term, however, he was not securing 
any death sentences, setting a precedent that his successor, Eddie Jordan, followed, as did Leon 
Cannizzaro, Jordan’s successor. The case of Orleans illustrates the point that even in counties 
where prosecutors adhere to national trends, those individuals can still have a significant impact 
on county rates.  
Death sentencing in Bexar County, Texas, has followed the national trend quite closely, 
with peak rates occurring during Steve Hillbig’s term, just after the peak in the national rate. 
Still, Hillbig almost tripled the rate of his predecessors in the mid-1990s. Cuyahoga County, 
Ohio, has also seen a steady decline mirroring that of the national rate. Interestingly, however, 
death sentencing rates under Stephanie Jones declined significantly throughout the 1990s, and 
the peaks of her term were still lower than those of her predecessor, John Corrigan. Nonetheless, 
the two most recent Cuyahoga prosecutors, Tim McGinty and William Mason, have maintained 
substantially lower rates than their predecessors. It is still important to note that sentencing peaks 
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occurring during Mason’s term are a virtual match for certain years of Jones’, indicating a likely 
influence by the latter.  
While death sentencing rates in Miami-Dade County7, Florida, are relatively low 
compared with others on the list, we see a distinct shift in the practice when Katherine Rundle 
takes office in the mid-1990s. While the rate peaked during her first year in office, she averaged 
a rate nearly half that of her predecessor, Janet Reno. It is still important to note, of course, that 
the rate mirrors the pattern of national death sentencing. At the same time, Reno maintained a 
relatively consistent rate throughout her term, even throughout high sentencing periods.  
Philadelphia8 similarly saw its death sentencing rate rise and fall with the national trends. 
Still, Ron Castille and Lynne Abraham—another infamously zealous prosecutor—oversaw peaks 
in the rate hovering just over 3 per 100 homicides. Despite Abraham’s reputation, she maintained 
an average rate lower than that of her predecessor, even during intense national peaks. While 
sentencing under her office declined steadily throughout the 2000s, Seth Williams made quite an 
impact in 2010 when the county rate reached nearly zero.  





7 Richard Gerstein, who served through 1977, was excluded from Miami illustration. 
8 F. Emmett Fitzpatrick, who served through 1977, was excluded from Philadelphia illustration.  
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Figure 7 Cont. 
 
Figure 7 displays the counties that have had some individual impact by prosecutors but 
minimal alignment with national trends. Cook County9 experienced a steady decline until the 
practice was outlawed in 2011, with the only substantial county peak occurring during Richard 
Daley’s term in the 1980s. National sentencing trends in the 1990s were just as high—and at 
certain points higher—than those in the 1980s. Jack O’Malley, who served in the 1990s, barely 
sentenced over .5 per 100 homicides, indicating the presence of individual impact. We see a 
similar case in Maricopa10, where Richard Romley served during the height of national death 
sentencing and, yet, had an average rate significantly lower than that of his predecessor, Tom 
Collins. In fact, Romley’s successor, Andrew Thomas—who served as national death sentencing 
was steeply declining—had a higher rate. 
Prosecutors in Jefferson, Alabama, have maintained relatively similar rates to one 
another, even when accounting for national trends. David Barber, who served during both 
national peaks, maintained a rate lower than his successor, who served just after the practice’s 
reinstatement in 1976. Aside from one high sentencing year just before 2000, when Barber used 
the death penalty at a rate of over 4 per 100 homicides, the rest of his term looks quite similar to 
 
9 Cecil A. Partee, who served from mid-1989 through late 1990, was excluded from Cook illustration. 
10 Richard Romley’s second term, which lasted about six months in 2010, was excluded from Maricopa illustration. 
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that of his successor, Brandon Falls—who has sentenced at a rate of less than 1 per 100 
homicides since taking office just prior to 2010. 
The final county in this series, Dallas, Texas, has followed national trends quite 
minimally. The county’s highest rates occurred under Bill Hill, who served during the nation’s 
decline in the 2000s. Dallas surprisingly hit one of its lowest rates during the national height in 
the early to mid-1990s. Chris Watkins, who served from 2008 to 2012, oversaw a rate virtually 
the same as that in the 1980s under Henry Wade, providing evidence for some prosecutorial 
preference. 









Figure 8 Cont. 
 
 
Figure 8 shows those jurisdictions where individual prosecutors have had very minimal—
if any—impact; that is, the county rate has remained relatively consistent throughout the modern 
period. In San Bernardino, California, rates of each prosecutor have all hovered close to 1 per 
100 homicides. Michael Ramos, in fact, has maintained a rate virtually identical to that of David 
Kottmeier, who served from 1981 to 1994.  
For Tarrant County, Texas, the graph shows very few deviations from county trends, 
except in the early 2000s when Tim Curry sentenced at a rate of nearly 6 per 100 homicides. 
This consistency is especially surprising considering that the rate in Tarrant barely shows any 
influence of the national trends until very recently.  
We see a similar recent drop but otherwise consistent tradition over time in Shelby, 
Tennessee. Until 2010, when the average rate fell to .32 under Amy Weirich, the rate hovered 
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around one sentence per 100 homicides. Weirich’s impact is surprising, considering the Fair 
Punishment Project ranked her first for misconduct in Tennessee. Distinguishing itself from 
Tarrant in regard to the national trend, Shelby shows a recognizable spike in 1992 as aggressive 
sentencing trends were beginning to rise around the country. While Bill Gibbons maintained a 
consistent rate around 1 per 100 homicides throughout his term, he oversaw more than triple that 
rate in his first year in office. This indicates a slight individual impact and also serves as 
evidence for the possibility of initially aggressive sentencing after an election or appointment in 
order to make good on “tough on crime” promises made during campaigns. Patterns in San 
Diego also mimic those of Shelby, as all three prosecutors maintained rates that hovered around 
1 per 100 homicides.  
Similar to prosecutors in Shelby, those in Sacramento maintained relatively consistent 
rates in the modern period, with the exception of John Daugherty. Steve White, however, who 
served in the early 1990s, barely sentenced at a rate above 1 per 100 homicides. Of note is Jan 
Scully’s rate during her first year of office, when she sentenced at a rate of 6 per 100, 
substantially higher than any other year of her term. Again, this indicates the presence of a first-
year effect similar to that of Bill Gibbons in Shelby.  
Despite being the county with the highest number of death sentences in the country, Los 
Angeles11 has maintained some of the lowest sentencing rates of the top counties. Since 1976, no 
prosecutor has sentenced at a rate over 1 per 100 on average. The most aggressive sentencing 
year was 1999, under Gil Garcetti, with a rate of 1.5 per 100 homicides. Los Angeles is evidence 
of death sentencing tradition taking place on a county level and provides a counter example to 
the theory of individual prosecutorial impact. Patterns in Polk County echo similar evidence. The 
 
11 Robert Philibosian, who served from 1983 through late 1984, was excluded from Los Angeles illustration. 
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Florida jurisdiction exhibits the third highest death sentencing rate on the top 30 list. This 
aggressive use of the practice has been consistent throughout the modern era under both 
prosecutors. Interestingly, the rate remained consistent even in times of heightened national 
sentencing.  
The prosecutors in the final county of this series, Duval, Florida, maintained average 
rates consistent with one another, but also displayed inconsistent patterns within their terms. 
Both Harry Shorstein and Angela Corey sentenced aggressively in the beginning of their terms, 
each hitting a rate more than double that of what their average rate would come out to. This is 
further evidence of the impact of campaigning and public scrutiny on prosecutors early in their 
terms.  
Figure 9. Broward County, Florida 
 
The final illustration includes only one county, Broward, in which a single prosecutor has 
held office since 1977. The patterns throughout Michael Satz’s term demonstrate the fluctuation 
that can surround the practice. At the same time, however, the peaks of sentencing all congregate 
around similar numbers until about the last decade and with the exception of 2000. The 
consistency in Broward suggests an adherence to precedent, all overseen by Satz in the modern 
era of the practice.   
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This chapter of analysis on prosecutorial impact has shown there to be numerous counties 
in which prosecutors deviate substantially from one another in death sentencing rates. The 
combination of the first three sections of results have offered a bivariate, preliminary analysis. 
While population, number of homicides, and the individual prosecutor do all appear to impact 
the county sentencing rate to a certain extent, regression analysis is necessary to determine 
statistical significance. The key question pertaining to this study is whether—controlling for 
relevant county factors—prosecutors have an additional effect on county death sentencing 
patterns.   
Regression Analysis 
 
In this final and most comprehensive chapter of analysis, I will present the results of a 
regression to determine which variables are the most relevant in predicting death sentencing 
trends in a county. The regression will show the statistical significance of the multiple variables I 
have explored in the previous chapters. Most importantly, the model will offer a definitive 
answer regarding whether prosecutors account for an additional impact on county trends. 
Table 3. Regression Estimation Results 









Homicides 0.342*** 0.115 0.125 -0.0730 
 (9.01) (1.64) (1.80) (-0.80) 
Total Population 
(Log) 
0.350* 2.723*** 2.644*** 3.402*** 
 (2.37) (6.35) (6.11) (4.04) 
Cumulative Death 
Sentences 
0.0998*** -0.167*** -0.145*** -0.172** 
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 (5.93) (-6.15) (-5.22) (-2.94) 
Racial Threat 1.279 -6.504*** -6.443*** -4.289 
 (1.47) (-4.08) (-4.07) (-1.87) 
Poverty 0.456** -0.0650 -0.0132 0.105 
 (3.29) (-0.44) (-0.09) (0.45) 
National Death 
Sentences 
0.00998*** 0.0109*** 0.0106*** 0.0107*** 
 (10.34) (11.50) (11.15) (9.34) 
_Constant         -7.227***        -30.20***          -29.28***         -41.15*** 
 (-3.83) (-5.96) (-5.70) (-3.95) 
R2 0.383 0.493 0.499 0.585 
N 1195 1195 1174 1174 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Table 312 presents the results of estimating logistic regressions for four different models. 
The first model is a baseline that includes the most salient predictors of death sentences in one of 
the top 30 death sentencing counties. As may be expected, homicides do have a significant 
impact on whether a county will use the practice. The number of death sentences a county has 
imposed in the past also has a substantial impact on whether that county will impose another in 
the future. This is evidence for the county momentum or personality theory. Poverty has a 
statistically significant impact that is similar to the previous variables. Racial threat is a 
significant predictor as well. Racial threat13 is the idea that up to a certain threshold, as the 
minority population increases, sentencing will become harsher as the white population senses a 
threat. Finally, the number of total death sentences in the U.S. does in fact have a major impact 
on county-level sentencing trends. 
 
12 For full regression results, see appendix. 
13 The value of racial threat is computed with the following formula: 100 − |70−white population|. 
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The second model adds in county fixed effects to the analysis. If the impact of the county 
itself was a consistent predictor of death sentences, we would expect to see significant 
coefficients next to the majority of each county fips. This is not what we see, however. Of the 30 
counties, only 10 have a significant effect. We do see that there are a small number of outlier 
counties that deviate substantially from what should be expected from the regression.  
In order to ensure accuracy and reliability, the third model is limited to those counties in 
which the top prosecutor served for four or more years. This model can then be compared to the 
final model. Using the exact same set of cases, Model 4 introduces the impact of individual 
prosecutors. If an individual prosecutor effect was consistently present, we would expect to see 
significant coefficients next to the majority of prosecutors in the regression. Similar to the county 
effects, however, the majority of prosecutors have no impact on county death sentences. Exactly 
13 prosecutors have a significant impact on death sentencing in their county. At the same time, 
there are other outliers that result in a coefficient much different than what would be predicted 
otherwise. Of course, 5% of cases is what can be expected to be statistically significant by 
chance. Thirteen prosecutors out of 123 comes out to just over 10% of cases and, thus, renders a 
relevant finding. The following table shows the results of that part of the regression. 
Table 4. List of Prosecutors Imposing Individual Impact 
Prosecutor 
Regression 
Coefficient (St. err.) 
 
Actual v. Pred DS 
 
Residual Ratio 









 (2.05)   










 (3.28)   
Gil Garcetti  
(Los Angeles, CA) 
2.304* 
+14 +1.20 





 (-2.03)   




 (-2.18)   



















 (3.41)   
Rex Bell (Clark, NV) 3.656*** +10 +1.39 





 (3.64)   
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Regression results shown in Table 414 identify the 13 prosecutors who had a statistically 
significant impact on the death sentencing rate in their counties, after controlling for all other 
variables included in the regression.15 The table displays the regression coefficient and level of 
significance of each prosecutor’s impact. The adjacent column puts forth the residual value of 
each prosecutor’s deviation; that is, the difference between the number of death sentences they 
actually oversaw and the number they were predicted to oversee by the regression’s estimation. 
 
14 See appendix for full regression and residual results. 
15 Those variables include: Population, Homicides, Cumulative Death Sentences, Racial Threat, Poverty, National 
Death Sentences, and County Fixed Effects. 
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Because the value of the residual can indicate very different impacts based on the county in 
which it occurs, the final column includes the residual ratio16 of each prosecutor, to show the 
impact per 100 homicides.  
The most substantial impacts were made by Ron Castille and Lynne Abraham of 
Philadelphia, Rex Bell of Clark, and Johnny Holmes from Harris. Those making a mild impact 
were Janet Reno of Miami and Chuck Rosenthal of Cook. Ashley Rich of Mobile, Bill James of 
Hillsborough, Carol Vance of Harris, Gil Garcetti of Los Angeles, Grover Trask of Riverside, 
Harry Connick Sr. of Orleans Parish, and Lawson Lamar of Orange County in Florida were the 
least statistically significant. Looking at the regression, we see that those prosecutors with the 
most impact did not necessarily deviate from their predicted rate by the highest numbers. For 
instance, Janet Reno secured 18 more death sentences than she was predicted to and, yet, was not 
found to be as significant as Rex Bell or Ron Castille, who went over his predicted value by 17 
sentences. There are also many prosecutors who were predicted to have sentencing values of 
zero and, yet, doled out many more. For instance, Bonnie Dumanis (not included in Table 4) was 
predicted to have just one and, yet, oversaw 12. Perhaps the most striking impact was Ashley 
Rich, who oversaw nine, but had a predicted value of zero. Rich sentenced at a rate of 2.78 per 
100 homicides.  
If my first hypothesis is correct—that is, death sentencing rates are exclusively based on 
county-level factors—we should not see any impact from more than 5% of prosecutors in the 
regression. We do see a statistically significant impact from a little more than 10%, however, 
which means H1 cannot be entirely correct. Recalling that H2 argued that controlling for county 
effects and national trends—as this regression does—individual prosecutors should further 
 
16 Residual ratio calculated by dividing the actual death sentence value by the predicted value.   
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impact sentencing rates. Again, we do see this to an extent, thereby confirming some truth to the 
second hypothesis set forth. As I have mentioned, the fact that prosecutors have the ability to 
impact a county rate in a statistically significant manner constitutes a relevant finding.  
The results from the regression estimates have provided evidence for which factors can 
predict death sentencing trends. I have established that population, number of homicides, 
cumulative death sentences, poverty, racial threat, and the number national death sentences all 
impact the number of death sentences in a county. Some county fixed effects—that is, the county 
itself—have an additional impact. Most importantly, this section has established the percentage 
of prosecutors who impose change in county death sentencing trends to the extent that it is 
statistically significant. Thus, this section has confirmed the existence of prosecutorial preference 
in some of these top 30 counties.  
Discussion 
This paper has sought to explore the question of what has caused the immense 
discrepancy in modern death sentencing seen across the United States. At the onset of this paper, 
I proposed the idea that there was another explanation that most research had not explored. That 
is prosecutorial preference, or the idea that individuals can impose their own beliefs and 
influence on sentencing trends, going beyond adherence to county tradition and practice. I set 
forth two hypotheses, one that relied exclusively on county effects and a second that suggested 
that beyond these county effects, there exists the effect of a single person—the top prosecutor in 
that county. To an extent, both hypotheses were confirmed. 
In order to study this impact, I selected only the top 30 counties with the highest 
cumulative death sentences in the modern period. First, I demonstrated that this total number had 
only a mild correlation with county population and total homicides, and that the death sentencing 
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rate itself was virtually random and, therefore, unlikely to be a result of an effort to deter crime 
with aggressive sentencing practices. That same analysis also demonstrated the substantial 
discrepancy within states, with Florida and California bouncing from rates of under one death 
sentence per 100 homicides to over three.  
The second part of analysis demonstrated the relationship between prosecutors in the 
same county. If county-level tradition was the most significant predictor, we should have seen a 
high correlation. While this correlation was mild, there were clearly a substantial number of 
outliers established. Expanding on this, I presented an illustration for each of these top 30 
counties that demonstrated the difference over time between prosecutors serving in the same 
county. This part of analysis showed significant impact of some while others clearly adhered to 
county precedent. It also indicated that national trends greatly influenced those at the county 
level.  
The final and most substantial part of results presented regression estimates to test 
which—if any—prosecutors had a statistically significant impact after controlling for the most 
salient predictors that had been established. Homicides, Cumulative Death Sentences, and the 
number of National Death Sentences were the most significant indicators. Poverty and Racial 
Threat variables were also significant. Controlling for this model, I added in county fixed effects, 
which showed large impacts by some counties and minimal to no impact by others. The most 
important finding, prosecutorial impact, was added into the final model. The results of this 
addition established that—similar to county effects—while the majority of prosecutors fail to 
have any significant impact on their county’s sentencing rate, about 10% do. This percentage is 
extremely relevant because it shows an effect of prosecutors above what can be attributed to 
chance.  
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Overall, this study has shown that there are numerous factors that impact county death 
sentencing trends and, thus, impact the extreme concentration of the practice across the country. 
Those factors vary by county, even when those counties are housed in the same state. Most 
importantly, trends are in fact impacted by the current prosecutor in office in some instances. In 
sum, the combination of my analyses shows the practice to be influenced by a number of non-
legal and discriminatory factors. 
Conclusion 
Is a practice that relies on racial discrimination, poverty of citizens, and, in some 
instances, the mercy of one, an acceptable one? When the Supreme Court ruled in 1976 that 
American judicial systems would be allowed to resume death sentencing, the implication was 
that the flaws of the previous system had been removed. Those flaws depicted a system not 
based on legal factors or justice but, rather, founded on principles of discrimination and 
randomization. This study has shown that more than 40 years later, the system remains similarly 
unjust.  
While this analysis focuses on the death sentencing practices of the top 30 counties, my 
findings point to larger issues within the practice of capital punishment. Prosecutors in the 
United States hold an extensive amount of authority in the criminal justice system. Thus, they 
wield immense discretion, not only over the fate of each individual who comes in contact with 
the system in their jurisdiction, but the county’s overall sentencing trends.  
 It is important to consider the fact that prosecutors are, with the exception of only a few, 
elected officials. The voters, then, are the most powerful force against or in favor of their county 
prosecutor. While it may be argued that this is a display of a democracy fulfilling its role, it is 
necessary to consider whether the drastic differences that can occur within a state and at the 
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national level satisfy the 14th Amendment and the requirements set forth by the Justices in the 
Furman decision of 1972 as well as the Gregg decision of 1976. The current circumstance of 
counties within the same state adhering to drastically different sentencing practices is 
reminiscent of Justice Stewart’s words that compared capital punishment practices to the odds of 
being struck by lightning. As the country approaches the half-century anniversary of that 
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Table 3 Cont. 
 Baseline County Fixed Effects 
DAs with 4 years of 
service 
DA Included 
Homicides 0.342*** 0.115 0.125 -0.0730 
 (9.01) (1.64) (1.80) (-0.80) 
     
Total Population 
(Log) 
0.350* 2.723*** 2.644*** 3.402*** 
 (2.37) (6.35) (6.11) (4.04) 
     
Cumulative Death 
Sentences 
0.0998*** -0.167*** -0.145*** -0.172** 
 (5.93) (-6.15) (-5.22) (-2.94) 
     
Racial Threat 1.279 -6.504*** -6.443*** -4.289 
 (1.47) (-4.08) (-4.07) (-1.87) 
     
Poverty 0.456** -0.0650 -0.0132 0.105 
 (3.29) (-0.44) (-0.09) (0.45) 
     
National Death 
Sentences 
0.00998*** 0.0109*** 0.0106*** 0.0107*** 
 (10.34) (11.50) (11.15) (9.34) 
     
1073.fips  0 0 0 
  (.) (.) (.) 
     
1097.fips  0.706 0.528 0.547 
  (1.39) (1.04) (0.54) 
     
4013.fips  -1.017 -1.006 -2.083 
  (-1.47) (-1.45) (-1.57) 
     
4019.fips  -0.607 -0.587 -0.400 
  (-1.34) (-1.31) (-0.48) 
     
6001.fips  -2.932*** -2.842*** -3.158** 
  (-5.06) (-4.91) (-3.15) 
     
6037.fips  -1.131 -1.332 -0.515 
  (-0.92) (-1.07) (-0.23) 
 50 
     
6059.fips  -3.593*** -3.456*** -3.779** 
  (-4.94) (-4.73) (-2.77) 
     
6065.fips  -1.216* -1.136* -0.335 
  (-2.29) (-2.14) (-0.24) 
     
6067.fips  -2.231*** -2.120*** -2.775* 
  (-4.43) (-4.16) (-2.42) 
     
6071.fips  -2.869*** -2.777*** -3.089** 
  (-5.12) (-4.95) (-2.64) 
     
6073.fips  -4.493*** -4.340*** -5.763*** 
  (-6.31) (-6.06) (-3.95) 
     
12011.fips  -1.941*** -1.878*** -2.449** 
  (-3.59) (-3.47) (-2.58) 
     
12031.fips  0.919* 0.891* 0.729 
  (2.02) (1.97) (0.83) 
     
12057.fips  -0.942* -0.921* -1.650 
  (-2.02) (-1.99) (-1.81) 
     
12086.fips  -1.611** -1.591** -2.938** 
  (-2.70) (-2.65) (-2.63) 
     
12095.fips  -1.113* -1.074* -0.307 
  (-2.44) (-2.37) (-0.34) 
     
12103.fips  -1.549** -1.494** -1.545 
  (-3.11) (-3.02) (-1.60) 
     
12105.fips  -0.220 -0.192 0.406 
  (-0.47) (-0.41) (0.37) 
     
17031.fips  -3.118** -3.366*** -4.493* 
  (-3.27) (-3.51) (-2.56) 
     
22071.fips  -1.841** -1.903*** 0.579 
  (-3.20) (-3.31) (0.47) 
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32003.fips  0.132 0.165 -0.176 
  (0.28) (0.34) (-0.17) 
     
39035.fips  -1.456** -1.437** -2.169* 
  (-2.87) (-2.83) (-2.28) 
     
39061.fips  -0.331 -0.327 -1.752 
  (-0.72) (-0.72) (-1.69) 
     
40109.fips  1.751*** 1.705*** 2.732* 
  (3.78) (3.71) (2.28) 
     
42101.fips  0.521 0.441 -1.027 
  (0.82) (0.69) (-0.74) 
     
47157.fips  -1.651** -1.638** -1.472 
  (-3.25) (-3.24) (-1.37) 
     
48029.fips  -1.749*** -1.706** -1.945 
  (-3.38) (-3.30) (-1.93) 
     
48113.fips  -2.296*** -2.220*** -2.831* 
  (-3.79) (-3.63) (-2.37) 
     
48201.fips  3.046*** 3.400*** -1.143 
  (4.11) (4.55) (-0.63) 
     
48439.fips  -1.900*** -1.824*** -2.366** 
  (-3.66) (-3.51) (-2.61) 
     
DANumber1    0.0502 
    (0.05) 
     
DANumber2    2.209 
    (1.90) 
     
DANumber3    -1.021 
    (-0.70) 
     
DANumber4    1.131 
    (1.39) 
 52 
     
DANumber5    -1.239 
    (-1.02) 
     
DANumber6    -0.136 
    (-0.09) 
     
DANumber7    1.226 
    (1.26) 
     
DANumber8    2.025* 
    (2.25) 
     
DANumber9    -0.789 
    (-1.23) 
     
DANumber10    0.792 
    (0.62) 
     
DANumber11    -0.146 
    (-0.23) 
     
DANumber12    0.132 
    (0.15) 
     
DANumber13    1.317 
    (1.51) 
     
DANumber14    1.774* 
    (2.05) 
     
DANumber15    0.701 
    (0.61) 
     
DANumber16    -0.0666 
    (-0.07) 
     
DANumber17    -1.214 
    (-1.26) 
     
DANumber18    0.987 
    (0.93) 
 53 
     
DANumber19    0.951 
    (1.14) 
     
DANumber20    0.513 
    (0.49) 
     
DANumber21    -1.659 
    (-1.20) 
     
DANumber22    4.168* 
    (2.21) 
     
DANumber23    0 
    (.) 
     
DANumber24    -1.311 
    (-1.81) 
     
DANumber25    0.220 
    (0.19) 
     
DANumber26    0 
    (.) 
     
DANumber27    -0.430 
    (-0.58) 
     
DANumber28    3.832** 
    (3.28) 
     
DANumber29    0.130 
    (0.15) 
     
DANumber30    -0.123 
    (-0.15) 
     
DANumber31    -1.388 
    (-1.36) 
     
DANumber32    -1.227 
    (-1.32) 
 54 
     
DANumber33    -0.729 
    (-0.95) 
     
DANumber34    -0.371 
    (-0.44) 
     
DANumber35    0 
    (.) 
     
DANumber36    0.651 
    (0.74) 
     
DANumber37    0 
    (.) 
     
DANumber38    -0.555 
    (-0.80) 
     
DANumber39    -1.247 
    (-0.94) 
     
DANumber40    -1.046 
    (-0.98) 
     
DANumber41    -0.0370 
    (-0.05) 
     
DANumber42    0 
    (.) 
     
DANumber43    -1.116 
    (-1.02) 
     
DANumber44    0 
    (.) 
     
DANumber45    2.304* 
    (2.27) 
     
DANumber46    -2.114* 
    (-2.03) 
 55 
     
DANumber47    -0.390 
    (-0.47) 
     
DANumber48    -2.068* 
    (-2.18) 
     
DANumber49    0 
    (.) 
     
DANumber50    -0.445 
    (-0.54) 
     
DANumber51    1.109 
    (0.88) 
     
DANumber52    -0.285 
    (-0.32) 
     
DANumber53    -0.512 
    (-0.44) 
     
DANumber54    1.492 
    (1.53) 
     
DANumber55    -0.696 
    (-0.62) 
     
DANumber56    0.447 
    (0.38) 
     
DANumber57    0 
    (.) 
     
DANumber58    -0.0210 
    (-0.02) 
     
DANumber59    2.216** 
    (3.29) 
     
DANumber60    -1.782 
    (-1.47) 
 56 
     
DANumber61    -0.611 
    (-0.78) 
     
DANumber62    -0.183 
    (-0.21) 
     
DANumber63    0.479 
    (0.60) 
     
DANumber64    0.219 
    (0.20) 
     
DANumber65    0 
    (.) 
     
DANumber66    -2.584 
    (-1.81) 
     
DANumber67    0 
    (.) 
     
DANumber68    0 
    (.) 
     
DANumber69    0 
    (.) 
     
DANumber70    0 
    (.) 
     
DANumber71    5.556*** 
    (4.56) 
     
DANumber72    1.572 
    (1.69) 
     
DANumber73    0 
    (.) 
     
DANumber74    0 
    (.) 
 57 
     
DANumber75    0 
    (.) 
     
DANumber76    -1.473* 
    (-1.99) 
     
DANumber77    0 
    (.) 
     
DANumber78    2.885*** 
    (3.41) 
     
DANumber79    0 
    (.) 
     
DANumber80    0 
    (.) 
     
DANumber81    0.732 
    (0.65) 
     
DANumber82    -1.328 
    (-1.70) 
     
DANumber83    1.336 
    (0.83) 
     
DANumber84    0 
    (.) 
     
DANumber85    0 
    (.) 
     
DANumber86    0 
    (.) 
     
DANumber87    -0.228 
    (-0.27) 
     
DANumber88    -0.710 
    (-0.50) 
 58 
     
DANumber89    0 
    (.) 
     
DANumber90    0 
    (.) 
     
DANumber91    0.191 
    (0.15) 
     
DANumber92    0 
    (.) 
     
DANumber93    0 
    (.) 
     
DANumber94    1.468 
    (1.52) 
     
DANumber95    3.656*** 
    (3.77) 
     
DANumber96    0 
    (.) 
     
DANumber97    0 
    (.) 
     
DANumber98    0.178 
    (0.21) 
     
DANumber99    0 
    (.) 
     
DANumber100    0 
    (.) 
     
DANumber101    0 
    (.) 
     
DANumber102    4.679*** 
    (3.64) 
 59 
     
DANumber103    -1.931 
    (-1.77) 
     
DANumber104    0 
    (.) 
     
DANumber105    -0.212 
    (-0.15) 
     
DANumber106    0 
    (.) 
     
DANumber107    -0.217 
    (-0.26) 
     
DANumber108    0 
    (.) 
     
DANumber109    0 
    (.) 
     
DANumber110    0.180 
    (0.22) 
     
DANumber111    0 
    (.) 
     
DANumber112    -1.615 
    (-1.43) 
     
DANumber113    0 
    (.) 
     
DANumber114    0 
    (.) 
     
DANumber115    0 
    (.) 
     
DANumber116    0 
    (.) 
 60 
     
DANumber117    0 
    (.) 
     
DANumber118    0 
    (.) 
     
DANumber119    0.689 
    (0.65) 
     
DANumber120    0 
    (.) 
     
DANumber121    0 
    (.) 
     
DANumber122    0 
    (.) 
     
DANumber123    0 
    (.) 
     
_cons -7.227*** -30.20*** -29.28*** -41.15*** 
 (-3.83) (-5.96) (-5.70) (-3.95) 
R2 0.383 0.493 0.499 0.585 
N 1195 1195 1174 1174 
t statistics in parentheses 

















Table 4 Cont. 
Prosecutor Pred. DS Actual DS County State DS Diff. 
 Ratio 
Diff.17 PredRate18 ActualRate 
Rate 
Resid.19 
Robert Eagan 13 25 Orange  FL 12 
            
1.97  1.62 3.18 
            
1.57  
Paul Zellerbach 8 15 Riverside  CA 7 
            
1.95  1.86 3.63 
            
1.77  
Cecil A. Partee 9 17 Cook IL 8 
            
1.85  0.49 0.90 
            
0.41  
Herb Jackson 4 7 Sacramento CA 3 
            
1.80  1.08 1.94 
            
0.86  
Angela Corey 11 19 Duval FL 8 
            
1.72  1.43 2.46 
            
1.03  
Rod Pacheo 9 16 Riverside CA 7 
            
1.72  2.18 3.74 
            
1.57  
Tony Rackauckas 20 35 Orange CA 15 
            
1.72  1.52 2.61 
            
1.09  
Quillian Yancey 5 9 Polk FL 4 
            
1.68  1.71 2.88 
            
1.17  
Wes Lane 8 14 Oklahoma OK 6 
            
1.67  2.61 4.36 
            
1.74  
Brandon Falls 4 7 Jefferson AL 3 
            
1.59  2.84 4.53 
            
1.68  
Ron Castille 30 47 Philadelphia PA 17 
            
1.56  1.45 2.27 
            
0.81  
Richard Daley 43 65 Cook IL 22 
            
1.49  0.62 0.92 
            
0.31  
Bill James 20 30 Hillsborough FL 10 
            
1.48  2.25 3.32 
            
1.07  
Joseph Deters 17 25 Hamilton OH 8 
            
1.46  1.29 1.88 
            
0.59  
Michael A. Ramos 12 17 San Bernardino CA 5 
            
1.45  0.57 0.82 
            
0.25  
Bill Hill 19 28 Dallas TX 9 
            
1.45  0.89 1.28 
            
0.40  
Andrew Thomas 19 27 Maricopa AZ 8 
            
1.44  1.16 1.66 
            
0.51  
Rex Bell 27 37 Clark NV 10 
            
1.39  3.11 4.32 
            
1.21  
Susan Reed 19 25 Bexar TX 6 
            
1.34  0.93 1.25 
            
0.31  
Janet Reno 53 71 Miami FL 18 
            
1.33  0.81 1.07 
            
0.27  
John Corrigan 42 55 Cuyahoga OH 13 
            
1.30  1.26 1.64 
            
0.38  
E.J. Salcines 15 18 Hillsborough FL 3 
            
1.23  1.91 2.34 
            
0.43  
Joe Shannon Jr. 4 5 Tarrant TX 1 
            
1.22  0.82 1.00 
            
0.18  
Bob Miller 22 26 Clark NV 4 
            
1.21  2.91 3.52 
            
0.61  
Stephen D. Neely 41 49 Pima AZ 8 
            
1.21  3.36 4.05 
            
0.69  
Gil Garcetti 72 86 Los Angeles CA 14 
            
1.20  0.64 0.77 
            
0.13  
Carol Vance 26 31 Harris TX 5 
            
1.20  1.12 1.35 
            
0.22  
Lynne Abraham 84 101 Philadelphia PA 17 
            
1.20  1.14 1.36 
            
0.22  
Steve Hillbig 21 25 Bexar TX 4 
            
1.19  1.36 1.62 
            
0.26  
 
17 Calculated by dividing the Predicted Death Sentence value by the Actual Death Sentence value. 
18 Predicted Death Sentencing Rate taken from regression. 
19 Rate Residual is the numerical difference between the Predicted and Actual Death Sentencing Rates. Negative 
values are shown in parentheses.  
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Bill Montgomery 16 18 Maricopa AZ 2 
            
1.13  1.12 1.27 
            
0.15  
Earl Morgan 15 17 Jefferson AL 2 
            
1.13  1.43 1.62 
            
0.19  
Hugh W. Stanton 24 27 Shelby TN 3 
            
1.13  1.11 1.25 
            
0.14  
Johnny Holmes 188 210 Harris TX 22 
            
1.12  1.56 1.75 
            
0.19  
Thomas J. Orloff 54 59 Alameda CA 5 
            
1.09  1.11 1.21 
            
0.10  
R. Philibosian 18 20 Los Angeles CA 2 
            
1.08  0.65 0.70 
            
0.05  
Arthur Ney Jr. 24 26 Hamilton OH 2 
            
1.08  4.79 5.15 
            
0.36  
Steve Cooley 66 70 Los Angeles CA 4 
            
1.06  0.59 0.63 
            
0.04  
Jackie Lacey 15 16 Los Angeles CA 1 
            
1.05  0.59 0.63 
            
0.03  
James T. Russell 37 39 Pinellas FL 2 
            
1.05  4.43 4.65 
            
0.22  
John Daugherty 13 13 Sacramento CA 0 
            
1.04  2.18 2.26 
            
0.09  
John Pierrotti 17 18 Shelby TN 1 
            
1.04  1.17 1.21 
            
0.04  
Bill White 12 12 Bexar TX 0 
            
1.04  1.04 1.07 
            
0.04  
Tim Curry 64 66 Tarrant TX 2 
            
1.03  1.42 1.46 
            
0.04  
Stewart Bell 27 28 Clark NV 1 
            
1.02  2.28 2.33 
            
0.05  
Andy Coats 11 11 Oklahoma OK 0 
            
1.00  3.20 3.22 
            
0.01  
Craig Watkins 12 12 Dallas TX 0 
            
1.00  0.70 0.70 
            
0.00  
Michael J. Satz 75 75 Broward FL 0 
            
1.00  1.85 1.85 
            
0.00  
Harry Shorstein 48 47 Duval FL -1 
            
0.99  2.40 2.37 
          
(0.03) 
Jack O'Malley 30 30 Cook IL 0 
            
0.98  0.49 0.48 
          
(0.01) 
Bill Gibbons 22 22 Shelby TN 0 
            
0.98  0.99 0.97 
          
(0.02) 
Steve White 8 8 Sacramento CA 0 
            
0.98  1.39 1.36 
          
(0.03) 
Bob Macy 83 80 Oklahoma OK -3 
            
0.97  4.29 4.15 
          
(0.13) 
Bernard Carey 20 19 Cook IL -1 
            
0.97  0.47 0.46 
          
(0.02) 
Bernie McCabe 25 24 Pinellas FL -1 
            
0.97  2.13 2.06 
          
(0.07) 
Dennis L. Stout 18 17 San Bernardino CA -1 
            
0.96  1.43 1.38 
          
(0.06) 
Richard Romley 79 74 Maricopa AZ -5 
            
0.94  1.67 1.56 
          
(0.11) 
John Vance 41 38 Dallas TX -3 
            
0.93  0.88 0.82 
          
(0.06) 
Jerry Hill 35 32 Polk FL -3 
            
0.92  3.39 3.13 
          
(0.26) 
Ed Austin 40 37 Duval FL -3 
            
0.92  2.15 1.98 
          
(0.18) 
David Barber 56 51 Jefferson AL -5 
            
0.92  1.60 1.47 
          
(0.13) 
Ira Reiner 75 69 Los Angeles CA -6 
            
0.92  0.56 0.51 
          
(0.05) 
Tom Collins 39 35 Maricopa AZ -4 
            
0.90  2.98 2.69 
          
(0.29) 
Charles F. Hyder 14 13 Maricopa AZ -1 
            
0.90  2.54 2.28 
          
(0.26) 
Chuck Rosenthal 45 40 Harris TX -5 
            
0.90  1.49 1.34 
          
(0.15) 
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Jan Scully 22 19 Sacramento CA -3 
            
0.87  1.20 1.05 
          
(0.16) 
Stephanie Jones 20 17 Cuyahoga OH -3 
            
0.85  1.58 1.35 
          
(0.23) 
Paul Pfingst 13 11 San Diego CA -2 
            
0.85  1.26 1.06 
          
(0.19) 
John V.D. Kamp 51 41 Los Angeles CA -10 
            
0.80  0.51 0.41 
          
(0.10) 
Michael Capizzi 25 20 Orange CA -5 
            
0.80  1.86 1.49 
          
(0.37) 
Harry Connick Sr. 46 37 Orleans LA -9 
            
0.80  0.66 0.53 
          
(0.13) 
Grover Trask 72 56 Riverside CA -16 
            
0.78  2.66 2.08 
          
(0.58) 
Simon Leis Jr. 19 15 Hamilton OH -4 
            
0.78  3.42 2.67 
          
(0.75) 
Henry Wade 26 20 Dallas TX -6 
            
0.78  0.68 0.53 
          
(0.15) 
Edwin L. Miller 31 24 San Diego CA -7 
            
0.77  0.89 0.69 
          
(0.21) 
John Tyson Jr. 16 12 Mobile AL -4 
            
0.76  1.63 1.23 
          
(0.40) 
Lawson Lamar 30 23 Orange FL -7 
            
0.76  1.86 1.40 
          
(0.45) 
Cecil Hicks 35 26 Orange CA -9 
            
0.75  2.49 1.87 
          
(0.62) 
Dennis Kottmeier 24 18 San Bernardino CA -6 
            
0.75  1.02 0.76 
          
(0.26) 
David Prater 12 9 Oklahoma OK -3 
            
0.74  1.44 1.07 
          
(0.37) 
Chris Galanos 23 17 Mobile AL -6 
            
0.73  1.87 1.36 
          
(0.51) 
Mark Ober 12 9 Hillsborough FL -3 
            
0.72  1.05 0.76 
          
(0.29) 
William Mason 11 8 Cuyahoga OH -3 
            
0.71  0.89 0.63 
          
(0.26) 
Amy Weirich 4 3 Shelby TN -1 
            
0.70  0.41 0.28 
          
(0.12) 
Fred Rodriguez 10 7 Bexar TX -3 
            
0.69  1.30 0.90 
          
(0.40) 
Barbara LaWall 22 15 Pima AZ -7 
            
0.67  1.40 0.94 
          
(0.46) 
Harry Coe 20 13 Hillsborough FL -7 
            
0.67  2.90 1.93 
          
(0.97) 
Katherine Rundle 52 34 Miami FL -18 
            
0.66  0.88 0.58 
          
(0.30) 
Byron Morton 9 6 Riverside CA -3 
            
0.65  1.69 1.10 
          
(0.59) 
Richard Devine 40 26 Cook IL -14 
            
0.65  0.49 0.32 
          
(0.17) 
David Roger 24 15 Clark NV -9 
            
0.63  1.59 1.00 
          
(0.58) 
Ed Rendell 49 30 Philadelphia PA -19 
            
0.62  1.71 1.06 
          
(0.65) 
Michael Allen 7 4 Hamilton OH -3 
            
0.61  1.52 0.94 
          
(0.59) 
Nancy O'Malley 6 3 Alameda CA -3 
            
0.50  0.65 0.33 
          
(0.32) 
Steve Wolfson 13 6 Clark NV -7 
            
0.47  1.70 0.80 
          
(0.90) 
Sam Millsap Jr.  11 4 Bexar TX -7 
            
0.37  1.32 0.49 
          
(0.83) 
Devon Anderson 16 4 Harris TX -12 
            
0.25  1.27 0.32 
          
(0.95) 
Pat Lykos 23 5 Harris TX -18 
            
0.22  1.44 0.32 
          
(1.13) 
Seth Williams 19 4 Philadelphia PA -15 
            
0.21  0.84 0.18 
          
(0.66) 
Mike Anderson 6 1 Harris TX -5 
            
0.18  1.47 0.26 
          
(1.21) 
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Anita Alvarez 6 0 Cook IL -6 
                   
-    0.43 - 
          
(0.43) 
Kenneth Magidson 6 0 Harris TX -6 
                   
-    1.36 - 
          
(1.36) 
F. Fitzpatrick 5 5 Philadelphia PA 0 
            
0.95  0.74 0.70 
          
(0.04) 
Michael Hestrin 3 9 Riverside CA 6 
            
2.80  1.48 4.15 
            
2.67  
George Holt 3 2 Clark NV -1 
            
0.65  1.58 1.03 
          
(0.55) 
John DeCarlo 3 3 Jefferson AL 0 
            
1.05  2.58 2.70 
            
0.13  
Jeff Ashton 3 1 Orange FL -2 
            
0.35  1.06 0.37 
          
(0.69) 
Richard Gerstein 3 6 Miami FL 3 
            
2.36  0.54 1.29 
            
0.74  
Nico LaHood 2 1 Bexar TX -1 
            
0.57  0.53 0.30 
          
(0.23) 
Susan Hawk 2 0 Dallas TX -2 
                   
-    0.32 - 
          
(0.32) 
James M. Cramer 1 5 San Bernardino CA 4 
            
3.62  0.26 0.93 
            
0.67  
John Price 1 1 Sacramento CA 0 
            
0.82  0.47 0.38 
          
(0.08) 
Charles Graddick 1 8 Mobile AL 7 
            
6.63  0.50 3.32 
            
2.82  
Bonnie Dumanis 1 12 San Diego CA 11 
         
15.61  0.05 0.78 
            
0.73  
Sharen Wilson 1 1 Tarrant TX 0 
            
1.40  0.35 0.49 
            
0.14  
A.M. Schubert 1 0 Sacramento CA -1 
                   
-    0.29 - 
          
(0.29) 
Ted Butler 0 1 Bexar TX 1 
                   
-    - 0.70 
            
0.70  
Phil Shailer 0 2 Broward FL 2 
                   
-    - 1.85 
            
1.85  
Moise Berger 0 2 Maricopa AZ 2 
                   
-    - 1.82 
            
1.82  
Ashley Rich 0 9 Mobile AL 10 
                   
-    - 2.78 
            
2.78  
Tim McGinty 0 1 Cuyahoga OH 1 
                   
-    - 0.27 
            
0.27  
Leon Cannizzaro.  0 1 Orleans LA 10 
                   
-    - 0.07 
            
0.07  
Keva L-Johnson 0 0 Orleans LA 1 
                   
-    - - 
                   
-    
Eddie Jordan 0 0 Orleans LA 0 
                   
-    - - 
                   
-    
 
